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Economic developmenta b s t r a c t
Beyond concerns about agricultural productivity growth, issues of land governance have attracted global
interest as demand for land acquisition by outsiders has increased rapidly but most of the transfers failed
to live up to expectations and instead disrupted local livelihoods. We use the land governance assessment
framework to identify key conceptual issues and identify how land governance in 10 African countries
compares to global good practice. Results point towards weak protection of rights in practice, large gaps
in female land access, and limited outreach and effectiveness of institutions to record rights and adjudi-
cate disputes. We note that programs to improve performance along these lines had signiﬁcant impact in
other contexts, suggesting that efforts to improve land governance will be warranted and should be clo-
sely monitored and evaluated in an effort to identify models suited to African conditions and assess their
impact and interaction with other factor markets.
 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Background and justiﬁcation
Issues of land governance have recently gained prominence for
two reasons. First, many African countries are seen as not having
realized their agricultural potential. Input use remains low and,
even in relatively land abundant countries, rural households seem
to cluster in areas with high population density or infrastructure
access and perceive land availability to be a key constraint for
expansion (Jayne, 2014). The fact that currently no country in
Sub-Saharan Africa achieves even 25% of potential yields (Byerlee
and Deininger, 2013) highlights the potential for vast improvement
and has been one of the motivating factors for an enormous recent
increase in investor interest. With a very high rural population
share, this affects poverty reduction as well as overall economic
development. Second, high demand for land by outside (not neces-
sarily foreign) investors together with evidence that these are often
unable to realize the expected gains in productivity, has raised con-
cern about large scale loss of local livelihoods through alienation of
large amounts of communal lands rights to which are only weaklyprotected in ways that often do not even involve local users. Ways
to quickly protect such rights and provide ways to bring them to
productive use have thus gained increased prominence.
Land tenure has long been viewed as a central element of devel-
opment efforts as it affects productivity through at least three
channels, namely (i) the likelihood of owners making land-
attached investments; (ii) the scope for transferring land to more
productive users and take up non-agricultural employment; and
(iii) the ability to use land as collateral for credit. Yet, results from
earlier interventions that were focused on (individual) title, that
failed to appreciate the political repercussions and institutional
complexity of the issue, and that neglected the imperatives of
broad coverage, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability, often failed
to live up to expectations (Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994).
By drawing on the results from the Land Governance Assess-
ment Famework (LGAF), a diagnostic tool developed by the World
Bank and partner institutions and now widely applied across the
globe, for a set of 10 African countries, this paper aims to identify
ways in which land governance more broadly deﬁned may affect
productive outcomes. The aim of the LGAF is to help countries
compare their land situation in 5 areas (land rights recognition,
land use planning, management and taxation, expropriation, public
provision of land information, and conﬂict resolution) against glo-
bal good practice via an ordinal ranking of some 80 dimensions
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et al., 2011b).
The justiﬁcation for doing so is that weak land governance
may affect cultivators’ (often women’s) ability to invest in
enhancing land productivity. LGAF results indeed point towards
signiﬁcant gaps in land governance in the 10 countries con-
cerned. Most importantly, legal recognition or formal papers
may not be enough but need to be backed by the ability to
defend such rights effectively and at low cost against competing
claims from the state or from other individuals. This is difﬁcult
without physically identifying plots on the ground. Failure to
delimit plots and publicly record ownership will make it more
difﬁcult for owners to transfer their land to others for longer
periods and then join the non-agricultural labor force as they
may fear not being able to claim it back. It will reduce commu-
nities’ ability to attract outside investors who could use parts
of land that are currently not needed in a way that could
enhance local welfare both directly and indirectly. And, without
public recording of ownership and the ability to transfer land,
using it as collateral to develop ﬁnancial systems is difﬁcult.
Beyond this, the regulatory framework for land governance will
affect women’s asset ownership, the level of corruption, local
governments’ ability to raise own revenue, land use in rural
and urban areas, and the pace of urbanization and associated
growth of non-farm employment opportunities.
All this suggests that restrictions on transferability of land,
especially in the presence of capital market imperfections, can lead
to a paradox of land scarcity existing side by side with un- or
underutilized rural land. Transferring land to outside or local
‘‘investors’’ may appear at ﬁrst sight as a sensible use of under-
utilized land but is unlikely to solve the problem if gaps in land
governance will reduce effectiveness and increase the (reputa-
tional) risk associated with such transfers. As foreign investors
have a choice, countries with abundant land but weak governance
will thus struggle to identify responsible and technically capable
investors. Improving land governance, on the other hand, could
unleash investment by small or medium farmers which may any-
way be a more realistic and sustainable path to intensiﬁcation than
the hope for large amounts of foreign agricultural investment.
While we cannot establish the link between land governance
and agricultural performance causally, examples of land gover-
nance reform from Africa and elsewhere highlight not only that
effective ways of dealing with the associated issues exist but also
that improved land governance led to improved outcomes. To pro-
vide the basis for more rigorous assessment of impacts, we identify
a number of indicators based on purely administrative data that
should be readily generated by any land administration system
in real time and that can be used not only to monitor changes
but, by generating overlays with socio-economic data, also provide
innovative avenues to identify broader impacts of improving land
governance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section ‘Conceptual frame-
work’ discusses the conceptual framework and the potential links
between land governance and agricultural performance by draw-
ing on the relevant literature and then using this to describe LGAF
indicators and methodology. Section ‘Evidence on land governance
constraints in 10 African countries’ presents substantive ﬁndings in
terms of rankings for the 10 countries in our sample compared to
global good practice. Section ‘Going beyond a diagnostic review’
argues that, to the extent that it is affected by the same land
governance constraints, outside investment will not provide a
shortcut to improve agricultural performance. It then uses case
studies of improving land governance and their impact to argue
that good land governance can help improve countries’ agricultural
productivity and uses this as the backdrop for sketching out
administrative data that will pick up much ﬁner changes at highlevel of spatial disaggregation, noting that this can help to assess
more causal links. Section ‘Conclusion and policy implications’
concludes by outlining potential next steps.Conceptual framework
This section reviews the literature to argue that good land
governance is important to provide incentives for investment and
efﬁciency-enhancing land transfers, to improve gender equity,
and enhance equality of opportunity and that any effort to improve
it will need to be cognizant of political economy, strengths and
weaknesses of traditional systems, and the costs and beneﬁts of
any intervention. It introduces the LGAF indicator and framework
and places Africa’s land endowment and land tenure system in
global context.Links between land governance and economic performance
Historically, the need to provide investment incentives was a
key factor in the emergence of land rights at the transition from
the hunter–gatherer stage (Binswanger et al., 1995) with the pros-
pect of being able to enjoy the fruits of their labor a key motivation
for owners to invest in land and manage it sustainably (Besley,
1995). Secure property rights affect economic outcomes most
immediately by reducing the risk of land loss, increasing invest-
ment incentives and reducing the need for individuals to spend
resources on protecting their rights (Besley and Ghatak, 2010).
Weak ownership rights, often for disadvantaged groups or outsid-
ers, have been shown to lead to signiﬁcant reductions in fallowing
that then reduced yields (Deininger and Jin, 2006; Fenske, 2010,
2011; Goldstein and Udry, 2008). The recent food and fuel crisis
highlighted the need for investment at all points in the value chain
inways allowing for synergies between small and large farms based
on their comparative advantage (Deininger and Byerlee, 2012).
Economic development normally involves specialization and a
move of part of the labor force out of the agricultural sector. This
induces heterogeneity in the population and increases the scope
for efﬁciency-enhancing land transactions (Deininger and Jin,
2005). Structural transformation, off-farm employment, and the
scope to add value by linking to supply chains and global markets,
all create opportunities to improve labor productivity in rural
areas. Exploiting these will require well-functioning factor mar-
kets, including for land. It has long been noted that low-cost and
ﬂexible mechanisms to bring land to its most productive use can
generate opportunities in the context of structural transformation
of rural economies and increase welfare (de Janvry et al., 2001). In
Kenya, land rental markets promote farm productivity and signiﬁ-
cantly raise the incomes of land-constrained farm households,
though not by enough to move them out of poverty (Jin and
Jayne, 2013), and an increasing body of literature supports the
growing demand for land rental in Africa (Baland et al., 2007;
Deininger et al., 2008a). Institutions that allow such at transactions
at low cost and allay or remove fears by those who transfer use
rights about not being able to reclaim their land can help to
respond to this and allow labor move out of agriculture without
foregoing the beneﬁts (e.g. social safety net functions of land
ownership). High transaction cost, caused by unclear rights or
institutional inefﬁciencies, can reduce the incidence of such trans-
actions, with potentially far-reaching impacts in the long-term
(Libecap and Lueck, 2011).
Land ownership is a key determinant of bargaining powerwithin
households. Women’s access to assets can affect girls’ survival rates
(Qian, 2008), their anthropometric condition (Duﬂo, 2003) and, for
some groups, investment in (girls’) schooling (Luke and Munshi,
2011). Yet, by allowing women to access land through male
1 Mexico’s 1992 reforms provided the option to fully individualize land tenure but
less than 15% of ejidos, mostly those in peri-urban areas, made use of this opportunity
(Zepeda, 2000). Communal management may thus have advantages even at rather
high levels of per capita income.
2 Complete coverage provides externalities that will be lost if some land owners opt
out of the system, e.g. because of an inability to afford fees. This is often used as an
argument for public support to ﬁrst registration so as to be able to offer it free of
charge, recovering costs later if needed.
3 The PEFA partnership, started in 2001, aims to strengthen recipient and donor
ability to assess country public expenditure, procurement and ﬁnancial accountability
systems, and develop a sequence of reform and capacity-building actions, in a way
that encourages country ownership, reduces the transaction costs to countries,
enhances donor harmonization, allows monitoring of progress of countries’ perfor-
mance over time, addresses developmental and ﬁduciary concerns, and leads to
improved impact of reforms. See www.pefa.org for details.
4 There is no intention to aggregate across indicators to come up with an ‘overall’
score of land governance at the country level which would be difﬁcult to justify
methodologically and almost meaningless in practice. At the same time, the fact that
assessments are done for the same indicators provides an opportunity to identify best
practice in a structured manner and transfer it across countries.
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in case of widowhood or divorce, customary systems often are
strongly biased against women. Such constraints affect not only
intra-household bargaining power (Behrman, 1990; Strauss et al.,
2000) but also efﬁciency of land use (Udry, 1996), women’s partic-
ipation in non-farm opportunities (Quisumbing and Maluccio,
2003) and their being affected by land conﬂict (Deininger and
Castagnini, 2006; Joireman, forthcoming).
Limited availability of land implies that, especially in settings
where land is a key asset, how access to and use of land are orga-
nized becomes highly political (Boone, 2007). In addition to being
documented qualitatively (Binswanger et al., 1995), a growing
number of studies now provide quantitative evidence of long-term
impacts of land institutions on outcomes, e.g. public good provi-
sion or educational attainment in India (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005;
Iyer, 2010), human capital and democratic development in Central
America (Nugent and Robinson, 2010), transparency and gover-
nance in Brazil (Naritomi et al., 2009) and ﬁnancial-sector develop-
ment in the US (Rajan and Ramcharan, 2011). In all of these cases,
land institutions and the way they changed had long-term impacts
on economic outcomes.
The literature not only illustrates potential beneﬁts from clear
land rights but also highlights that efforts to clarify them were
not always fully successful or sustainable in the longer term. Key
reasons include insufﬁcient appreciation of the distributional
aspects of land ownership and access; the complexity of existing
and overlapping land rights and the strengths and weaknesses of
traditional systems; and the requirements in terms of ﬁnancial
and human resources of conducting and maintaining land
administration systems and the need to make trade-offs between
precision and coverage.
While recognition of land rights can make everybody better off
in principle, it can easily degenerate into a zero-sum game. At low
levels of development, land is not only a productive asset but also
performs important functions as a social safety net and old-age
insurance. With credit-market imperfections, introducing transfer-
ability may give rise to distress sales or myopic transactions that
may have a negative social impact (Andolfatto, 2002). This has
often prompted communities to adopt rules limiting the scope
for land alienation to outsiders. If they are the product of a consci-
entious and participatory choice, arrived at by weighing associated
cost and beneﬁts and if ways to transact with outsiders as a group
are available, such rules are unlikely to be harmful. If and when
traditional social ties loosen or the efﬁciency gains from allowing
sales increase, groups can move towards gradual individualization
and sales to outsiders at their own pace. While it will be important
to document rights, efforts to liberalize markets in such situations
may be mis-placed, especially if operation of land markets may be
affected by economy-wide distortions, as in the case of Brazil
(Rezende, 2006). Titling efforts may set off speculative land acqui-
sition by powerful well-informed individuals (Benjaminsen and
Sjaastad, 2002; Peters, 2004) and without information campaigns,
they may formalize land access by elites but disempower the poor
(Jansen and Roquas, 1998). Land registration programs can also
legitimize or even encourage encroachment on public land, includ-
ing areas such of high environmental value, unless speciﬁc precau-
tions are taken.
A growing body of studies highlights that formalizing land
ownership via individual title is not always the most appropriate
solution; in fact, complex arrangements to deﬁne individuals’
rights and obligations within groups, e.g. through condominium
associations, are widely found in modern economies. In situations
of high risk, well-governed communal tenure arrangements can
provide more ﬂexibility and an important safety net (Baland and
Francois, 2005). Efforts to individualize such arrangements may
reduce the ﬂexibility of risk-management options by the poorand possibly leave them worse off.1 Attempts to replace local insti-
tutions that functioned reasonably well with ‘better’ ones that fail to
materialize can actually increase conﬂict (Deininger and Castagnini,
2006). Efforts to ‘formalize’ tenure must not eliminate or weaken
secondary or communal rights. Finally, neither land registration
nor registry operation is costless. They will be economically desir-
able only if the cost of establishing and maintaining these institu-
tions is matched by beneﬁts in terms of higher investment and
productivity-increases via land transfers. Analysis of costs and ben-
eﬁts is a precondition to decide how these should be distributed
between public sector and private users or spaced over time.2
The LGAF as a framework to identify and address land governance
constraints
Based on global experience, 5 key areas of land governance
areas were identiﬁed. On this basis, good land governance can be
deﬁned as (i) laws and institutions recognize existing rights and
allow users to exercise them at low cost, in line with their aspira-
tion, and in ways that beneﬁt society as a whole and that policy is
equitable, clear, derived in a participatory manner, implementation
is monitored; (ii) land use planning and taxation are in place to
avoid negative externalities, allow provision of services at low cost,
and support effective decentralization; (iii) state land is unambig-
uously identiﬁed and managed efﬁciently to provide public goods;
expropriation is used as a last resort for public purposes only with
quick payment of fair compensation and effective appeals mecha-
nisms while divestiture of state lands is done in a transparent way
that maximizes public beneﬁt; (iv) information on land ownership
(spatial or textual) is accessible, comprehensive, current, and
reliable; (v) interested parties can access institutions with clear
well-deﬁned mandates to authoritatively resolve disputes.
To summarize information on these in a structured way that
can be compared across countries, we build on the methodology
of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessment
(PEFA).3 Thematic areas provide the basis for a set of land gover-
nance indicators that are then broken down into 2–6 dimensions
each. Objective information to rank a country’s performance for each
of these dimensions should be available in broad categories that can
then be reﬁned subsequently. For each dimension, a 4 levels (from A
to D) ranking, based on a justiﬁcation, is to be assigned by panel
members using existing information. The fact that responses are
based on actual data, standardized coding, and involvement of key
technical experts help ensure comparability of rankings across coun-
tries. Table 1 provides examples to illustrate this for dimensions
based on quantitative information or qualitative assessment.4
While the LGAF framework is close to PEFA, implementation
modalities differ from it in three important ways. First, to capture
Table 1





A – More than 90% of records for
privately held land in the registry are
readily identiﬁable in maps held by the
registry or the cadastre
B – Between 70% and 90% of records for
privately held land in the registry are
readily identiﬁable in maps held by the
registry or the cadastre
C – Between 50% and 70% of records for
privately held land in the registry are
readily identiﬁable in maps held by the
registry or the cadastre
D – Less than 50% of records for
privately held land in the registry are
readily identiﬁable in maps held by the
registry or the cadastre
The public captures beneﬁts
arising from changes in
permitted land use
A – Mechanisms that allow the public to
capture a signiﬁcant share of the gains
from changing land use are regularly
used and applied transparently based
on clear regulation
B – Mechanisms that allow the public to
capture a signiﬁcant share of the gains
from changing land use are applied
transparently but not always used
C – Mechanisms that allow the public to
capture a signiﬁcant share of the gains
from changing land use are rarely used
and applied in a discretionary manner
D – Mechanisms that allow the public
to capture a signiﬁcant share of the
gains from changing land use are not
used or not applied transparently
Table 2
Land use, potential availability, and yield gap across regions. Source: FAOSTAT and







Africa 208,218 200,787 0.821
Australia & Oceania 49,943 31,250 0.309
East Asia & Paciﬁc 238,536 14,058 0.433




Middle East/N Africa 65,869 2756 0.604
North America 224,787 17,440 0.356
Western Europe 84,050 2202 0.169
South Asia 206,496 164 0.621
Total 1,491,491 444,292
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the exercise is not with outside experts but with a local expert who
serves as country coordinator. A key task of this person is to have
experts in the relevant areas summarize existing evidence, to
ensure all participants have access to the same information. Sec-
ond, groups of up to 10 dimensions are ranked by stakeholders
with in-depth expertise in the area who ideally arrive at consensus
rankings. To allow time for compilation of data, deliberation, and
consensus building, the exercise is conducted over a 3–5 month
period.
Following on an inception phase that is used to put together a
team, link up to relevant stakeholders, and produce a tenure typol-
ogy and institutional map, relevant material from existing studies
is synthesized in background reports (on land tenure, land use pol-
icy, public land management, and the land registry) by specialists
in the relevant areas to provide the substantive understanding
needed. Rankings for each of the dimensions are assigned by stake-
holder panels (private sector, banks, civil society, government ofﬁ-
cials, lawyers, academics, and professionals with links to the land
sector) in half- or full-day sessions which discuss each dimension
in detail to arrive at a consensus ranking and agreed policy priori-
ties based on panel members’ experience. A record of discussions is
agreed upon and synthesized in a draft country report which, after
review, is validated in a public national workshop that aims also to
prioritize policy conclusions and associated monitoring indicators
to be presented to policy-makers and partners.5 While it has been noted that more restrictive assumptions will result in a
signiﬁcant reduction of these estimates (Jordan et al., 2014), the intention of these
ﬁgures was to provide an upper bound to highlight that, even under optimistic
assumptions, the land area available for agricultural expansion is limited and, in
many cases, an order of magnitude lower than what was claimed by Governments
eager to advertise themselves to investors (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011).Putting Africa’s land tenure systems in context
Understanding Africa’s land governance is impossible without
appreciating the profound impact of colonial rule that conﬁnedsecure tenure to a few, often established dualistic systems that
discriminated against the local population, failed to recognize
communal rights entirely or, if recognizing local rights were, weak-
ened these through strong overriding provisions for the state as
ultimate land owner to acquire land for a range of causes consid-
ered to further the public good. Although they gave only weak, if
any, rights to local users, surprisingly many of these legal frame-
works experienced little change in the immediate post-indepen-
dence period.
Based on a recognition that prudent administration and man-
agement of land resources is critical to deal with rapid urbaniza-
tion and structural shifts in the economy, adapt to changing
external conditions, and make use of what is often an immensely
rich resource base, a wave of legislative reforms in the late 20th
century provide the basis for recognition and often also formal reg-
istration of communal rights. Yet, virtually everywhere implemen-
tation has been limited or non-existent so that even countries with
very progressive laws (such as Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania)
failed to translate theory into practice. More importantly, although
the importance of land is widely acknowledged, it does not feature
prominently in country strategies (Place, 2009) or the Comprehen-
sive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), possibly
because of institutional fragmentation whereby land is dealt with
by many and often ill-coordinated Ministries (agriculture, urban,
environment, forest), is technically complex, and often affects
powerful vested interests who may resist change.
Table 2 illustrates that Africa has some 45% of the global area
that is suitable for rainfed farming while being not forested, not
protected, and with population density of less than 25 per km2
(Deininger and Byerlee, 2011).5 At the same time, the aggregate
yield gap (country averages) for Sub-Saharan Africa overall is 82%,
implying that only 18% of potential yields on cultivated land are
actually achieved. This is almost the opposite of Western Europe
where, with a yield gap of 17%, 83% of biologically potential yields
are achieved, highlighting the scope for vast improvements. Experts
agree that Africa’s plentiful endowment of water and land imply that
a better policy environment and business climate could create vast
scope to proﬁtably produce bulk commodities. While infrastructure
constraints imply that, at least initially, supply would be limited to
domestic and regional markets these are estimated to be worth some
$50 billion a year and could eventually provide a springboard for
exports. This underlies the enormous recent increase in interest in
land by outsiders, either locals or foreigners.
Table 3
Salient characteristics of case study countries. Source: World Development Indicators and Deininger and Byerlee (2011).
DRC Gambia Ghana Madagascar Malawi Mauritania Nigeria Senegal South Africa South Sudan
Pop. (mn.) 65.7 1.8 25.3 22.3 15.9 3.8 168.8 13.7 51.2 10.8
Pop dens. 28 171 109 37 164 4 180 69 42 n.d.
Pop. growth 2.7 3.2 2.2 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.9 1.2 4.3
Urban (%) 35 58 53 33 16 42 50 43 62 18
Urbaniz. rate 4.3 4.2 3.4 4.7 3.8 3.2 4 3.6 1.9 5.4
GDP/capita 272 512 1605 447 268 1106 1555 1032 7508 862
% GDP agric 46 19 25 29 30 16 33 15 2
Yield gap 0.88 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.85 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.68 0.91
Potential area 22,498 1915 16,244 33 12 2283 1053 3555
Cult. area 14,739 6011 3511 2697 1096 34,052 5040 15,178
Note: ‘Potential area’ is the amount of land potentially suitable for rainfed cultivation as deﬁned in Deininger and Byerlee (2011).
8 Process of recognizing leasehold involves a committee, a planning process of
sorts, and a process of rights recognition (survey fee is still too high). This contrasts to
a community-based process that is not only more expensive but also more
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countries
Following a brief discussion of characteristics for the 10 African
countries that completed application of the LGAF, we discuss
results and compare them to what was obtained elsewhere. Doing
so highlights the dualistic structure of rights in virtually all cases
and points towards ways in which it can be overcome.
Country characteristics
Table 3 illustrates that the 10 African countries that were the
ﬁrst to complete the exercise cover a wide range of conditions in
terms of population density, levels of income, urbanization, and
land abundance.6 One common feature is that the yield gap is high,
pointing towards vast opportunities to increase land productivity
even on currently cultivated land without a need to expand into
previously uncultivated land. We note wide differences in the
contribution of agriculture to GDP, from 46% in DRC and 33% and
30% in Nigeria and Malawi, respectively, to 2% for South Africa
and 15%, 16%, and 19% for Senegal, Mauritania, and Gambia. Simi-
larly, there are vast areas of uncultivated land that could be
brought under rainfed production in DRC and Madagascar (22
and 16 mn. ha, respectively compared to virtually nothing in
Malawi and Mauritania). Still, the yield gap is universally high,
pointing towards vast opportunities to increase productivity even
on currently cultivated areas without a need to expand into frontier
areas.
Discussion of LGAF scores
Tables 4–8 present key LGAF results by displaying validated
rankings for each indicator in 10 countries of interest. Tables 4–8
visually present key LGAF results by displaying color-coded
validated rankings for each of the indicators in the 10 African coun-
tries. Three non-African countries (Brazil, Philippines, and Georgia)
are included to provide a broader cross-regional perspective and to
illustrate the scope the LGAF provides to draw on global good
practice even where African countries may not score well.7
Rights recognition
Focusing on issues directly relevant for agricultural production,
we ﬁnd that land rights, including those by groups, women,
migrants, and pastoralists, are recognized in general terms by
relevant laws, partly as a result of legal reforms in the late 20th
century. However, their subject or content is often ill-deﬁned and6 These countries are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, South Africa, South Sudan, and Senegal.
7 In some cases, panels felt that distinct differences between different domains
merited a split ranking. Also, areas where, for various reasons, no ranking could be
assigned are left blank.they are not demarcated or registered, making it difﬁcult to effec-
tively exercise such rights or defend them in case of dispute. High
demand for demarcation of rights and vast reductions in cost of
technology provide opportunities for participatory and low-cost
ﬁrst time registration in urban as well as rural areas.
Communal rights structures often come under stress as, with
increasing population density, traditional structures of account-
ability erode or break down and those appointed as custodians of
land start acting as landlords. In Ghana, land scarcity prompted
chiefs to sell land or survey it as private property (Berry, 2009).
Exogenous shocks can accelerate breakdown of traditional struc-
tures as in South Sudan, where high demand for registration and
secure land tenure led to schemes by local leaders that are often
biased against the poor and vulnerable.8 In these contexts, deﬁning
what constitutes a community (Bruce and Knox, 2009) and who is
authorized to make decisions on its behalf is needed. Having groups
themselves establish by-laws, to be changed by a qualiﬁed majority,
to govern land relations within the group, is a promising option to do
so as long as it includes separation of powers and consistent with
democratic values and transparency. The importance of the latter
is illustrated by South Africa’s 2004 Communal Land Rights Act
(CLRA) which, in 2010, was struck down as contradicting the coun-
try’s Constitution.9
Customary practice often discriminates against women by
allowing them to access land through spouses or men in their line-
age only. The LGAF illustrates that in many countries strong gender
bias in land access persists; with few African countries collecting
land information in a gender-disaggregated way, checks revealed
that, with the exception of South Africa, none of the 10 countries
has more than 20% of registered land rights in the name of females,
individually or jointly. Even where land is registered jointly or in
women’s name, inheritance is under family law which may make
it difﬁcult for females to hold onto land assets they own. This is
of concern in light of evidence that women play an increasing role
in agricultural cultivation. It is reinforced by the ﬁnding that inher-
ited assets, in particular the area of land inherited, are strong
determinants of women’s well-being (Kumar and Quisumbing,
2012).
Even if the subject of rights is well-deﬁned, nature and spatial
extent of recognized rights may remain unclear, especially
whether users will receive compensation if land is acquired by
the state. Often considerable residual rights held by the state, asdiscretionary without institutional presence and unclear procedures (little redress,
fees go to community leaders, ethnic preferences). It illustrates the high demand for
formally recognized tenure as well as the need to regulate the process. Surveyors may
also cheat and establish additional plots for their own use.
9 The main reason was that the power given to Traditional Councils which the Act
intended to include the ‘‘control over the occupation, use, and administration of
communal land’’ were in breach of the South African Constitution.
Table 4
LGAF scoring for recognition and respect for existing rights, 10 African and 3 non-African countries. Source: Own elaboration from country level LGAF reports.
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ity over land with State Governors, making land highly political
with weak accountability. In Senegal and Mauritania land owner-
ship is formally vested with the state and even long use cannot
lead to eventual ownership.10 Malawi’s new land policy aims to
address this by distinguishing government, public, and private land
and including under private land not only under freehold, but
also customary land allocated exclusively to a clearly deﬁned
community.
LGAF results show that boundaries of communal lands are not
demarcated in any of our countries. This makes it very difﬁcult
to defend rights against encroachment but can also frustrate inves-
tors’ efforts to negotiate with communal land owners in good faith
as they cannot discern legitimate from illegitimate interlocutors.
Even if a legal basis for registration exists, regulations often require
unaffordable high-cost approaches and taxes. In Malawi, survey
and development charges to be paid to gain recognition amount
to US$ 600 per plot, in addition to lawyer’s fees of 3% of property
value. In Gambia survey costs, in addition to recording fees,11 are
major obstacles to rights recognition. In Ghana, the cost of formal
title in externally funded projects averaged close to US$ 1000. In
Madagascar, title costs between US$ 500 and 1000 per plot (Jacoby
and Minten, 2007), often more than the underlying plot is worth
and intermediary forms of rights recognition have been adopted
under a participatory – though still sporadic and rather high cost
(US$ 15 per parcel) – approach to address this.12 In Tanzania, even10 Similar issues are encountered even in countries where rights have been vested in
locals; for example in Tanzania where the Village Land Act clearly vests the vast
majority of land in villages (Deininger et al., 2011b), attempts to reclassify land that is
‘not used’ to make it available and try and roll back such recognition are reported
from some cases (Locke, 2013).
11 Ofﬁcial fee are 5% of land value for stamp duty and 15% for capital gains tax.
Informal fees may more than double this in practice.
12 Over a period of about 7 years, this covered about 70,000 ha or 3% of cultivated
land (www.observatoire-foncier.mg). Only 20% of certiﬁcates are issued in the name
of women and even plots belonging to a couple are mainly registered in the name of
men.poor households are willing to pay for formal rights (Ali et al.,
2012). Reducing costs of recognition by cutting fees or taxes, elimi-
nating rents, and increasing efﬁciency of service delivery thus seems
critical.
In many instances gaps in the extent to which rights are identi-
ﬁable go together with an inability to transfer them through mar-
kets or inheritance or individualize if a consensus to do so exists.13
Even if rights are recognized, obstacles to land transfers may reduce
associated beneﬁts, especially in situations of structural change. In
South Africa, communal or tribal authority land is registered in the
Minister’s (or a Trust’s in KwaZulu) name. Individual use or transfers
require survey of outer boundaries and a legal regime and associated
regulations. Without these, rights may be secure, but investment,
credit access, and investment may suffer as shown in the Philippines
(Fabella, 2003).Land use planning, management, and taxation
Land use plans are often lacking or outdated and, if they exist,
elaborated in non-participatory ways that generate rents for some
but make it difﬁcult to provide services effectively and at low cost.
Deﬁnition of ‘urban expansion zones’ often not only conveys wide-
reaching powers of expropriation but also halts investment in what
could be one of the most productive agricultural zones with excel-
lent market access. Revising planning rules to emphasize incre-
mental approaches and affordability and a greater emphasis on
decentralized and ﬁscal incentives to cope with urban expansion
will be required.
At the same time, Table 5 also points towards positive examples
where dimensions have been rated as either ‘A’ or ‘B’. In South Africa
all municipalities, whether urban or rural, are required to prepare
integrated Development Plans that govern resource allocation and13 There is no possibility of individualizing communal lands in South Africa. In
Malawi, the 1967 Customary Land Development Act allowed the Minister to
demarcate and record rights in customary land for agricultural development but
required costly surveying.
Table 5
LGAF scoring for land use, management, and taxation, 10 African and 3 non-African countries. Source: Own elaboration from country level LGAF reports.
Table 6
LGAF scoring for management of public land, 10 African and 3 non-African countries. Source: Own elaboration from country level LGAF reports.
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rural land use plans have gained currency in a number of African
countries such as Madagascar and Senegal15 and, for forest areas in
the DRC based on the 2002 Forest Code. Such local land use planning
can precede efforts at clarifying tenure and determine management
arrangements that will be most effective given the resource base
(e.g. establishment of protected areas and associated management
plans or award of ancestral rights to indigenous communities). If done
before investor interest materializes, it could allow identiﬁcation of14 Legislation require municipalities to be self-funded and regulates key aspects of
land valuation such as the power to impose rates, the need for exemptions to be fair
and transparent, and the appeals processes to be followed. With property rates as key
revenue source, effective land management assumes an important role to enhance
local base. There are important spillovers as independent valuations are used to
determine compensation in cases of public land acquisition and aerial maps acquired
for tax mapping being used for planning and service provision.
15 For example of 385 communities in Senegal only 52 (i.e. less than 14%) have
actual plans and 48 of these are in the Senegal River Valley.areas where investment by outsiders will be desirable and welcome
by locals, possibly making it less conﬂictive.
As any changes in land use that impact land values will increase
property taxes, land taxation could create incentives for local gov-
ernments to increase land values through infrastructure construc-
tion or enhanced economic activity. A land tax that depends on the
potential rather than the actual use of land also can also create
incentives for landlords to put land to productive use. In practice,
the infrastructure, in terms of valuation standards and tax maps,
to bring about such a virtuous cycle is often lacking. Property tax-
ation then yields little revenue and may be applied in a discretion-
ary fashion. Low collection of local taxes not only makes it more
difﬁcult to provide services but also increases local governments’
dependence on transfers from the center that may be driven by
politics, thus weakening the link between taxation and service
provision. In addition to reducing the potential for using land as
a source of sustainable revenue, this encourages use of discretion-
ary incentives that often do not beneﬁt locals to attract outside
investors.
Table 7
LGAF scoring for public provision of land information, 10 African and 3 non-African countries. Source: Own elaboration from country level LGAF reports.
Table 8
LGAF scoring for dispute resolution and conﬂict management, 10 African and 3 non-African countries. Source: Own elaboration from country level LGAF reports.
17 There are many cases of conﬂict of interest whereby the acquiring body is also the
ﬁrst (and in some cases the only) instance for appeal.
18 Peru, for example, enforces tight regulations on expropriation. The constitution
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Public land management, acquisition, and divestiture are often
deﬁcient as boundaries of state land are ill-deﬁned, authorities
enjoy wide latitude in expropriating land without clear avenues
for independent appeal, and land is often privatized based on nego-
tiation rather than open tender. Most countries in our sample have
less than one third of their public land mapped, creating consider-
able uncertainty as this makes it easy to evict land users if the land
is needed for other purposes. Establishing an inventory of state
land, together with rules on how to handle encroachment and
how to transparently divest state land is an urgent priority and,
in cases where there is wide latitude for expropriation, should be
combined with properly circumscribing the cases when this instru-
ment can be used, the ways in which compensation is determined,
and avenues for appeal and potential remedies available.
While land needs to expand infrastructure are a key driver of
land acquisition in growing economies, in practice, many countries
also require land for private industry to be expropriated (Deininger
and Byerlee, 2011). Parlous land records and complex laws have
often led investors to prefer a ‘purge’ of previous rights via expro-
priation to direct negotiations to gain quick access to ‘secure’ land
rights.16 This has led to a surge in land acquisition, with some cases
having received considerable publicity (Ghatak et al., 2013; Ghatak
and Mookherjee, forthcoming). Governance challenges relate to
whether land is acquired for public purpose and used as intended,
prompt and fair compensation is provided (land that allows mainte-
nance of living standards) and avenues for appeal are available.16 While such an approach does not necessarily provide legitimacy, its attractive-
ness will be enhanced in situations where it is difﬁcult to unambiguously identify
right holders or their authorized representatives.The danger of expropriation with insufﬁcient compensation is
high in the context of urban expansion as many countries deﬁne
‘urban expansion zones’ very expansively with most of the affected
land unlikely to be urbanized for decades. While the purported
intention is to stop development that would then have to be com-
pensated, this also implies that highly productive land with excel-
lent market access may not be used for high-value production.
There are many examples of land having been acquired for ambi-
tious schemes that never materialized. Even if land acquisition pro-
cedures are well regulated, concern about valuations done by the
acquiring party, slow compensation payments, and lack of avenues
for appeal was widespread.17 In Nigeria, fear of expropriation by the
state is by far the most important source of rural tenure insecurity,
with clear impacts on investment and land values (Deininger and
Xia, 2014).18
It has long been known that conﬂict over land, either between
private parties or between private parties and the state, under-
mines productivity as land affected by conﬂict will be ‘frozen
out’ of any investment. While it is not surprising that weak
land information increases the scope for conﬂict (e.g. over fraud)
among private parties, conﬂicts with the state arise from unclear
assignment of institutional responsibility or lack of effectiveauthorizes it only if the State beneﬁts directly, requiring a special law for each case
and court proceedings for valuation. Orders lapse automatically if after 6 or 24
months valuation has not started or court proceedings not concluded or if, the
expropriated property is not yet used for its planned purpose one year after the court
process.
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log of cases,19 this may need to be complemented with administra-
tive ways to obtain legal counsel and dispose of conﬂict outside the
formal system.
Public provision of land information
In many of our countries, available information on land owner-
ship, especially spatial records, is partial, unreliable, not updated,
and not shared between public agencies, giving rise to duplication
and opening up opportunities for fraud and weak governance. High
transfer taxes, together with surveyor and notary fees, either drive
transactions into informality or lead to under-valuation and fraud.
Replacing them with land taxes, opening up heavily regulated sur-
veyor and notary monopolies to competition to reduce cost, and
making base maps and valuations public are measures used in
many contexts to improve on this.
Unless stakeholders in Government and the private sector have
access to reliable, current, comprehensive, and spatially explicit
information on land ownership at low cost, the scope for transfer-
ring land and using it as collateral will be impaired. Even in coun-
tries, e.g. South Africa, where the registry received high marks,
limited coverage often leaves the poor without protection of their
property rights (albeit through lower-cost approaches. In Nigeria
which scores ‘A’ on the ability to search and ‘B’ on the ability to
access the registry, less than 5% of land rights are identiﬁable on
a map.
Often, high fees for ﬁrst-time transfer or registration of land
unrelated to safeguards,20 act as a barrier to land market participa-
tion. Regulations requiring that land transfer be approved by
high-ranking ofﬁcials (the State Governor in Nigeria or the Minister
in Tanzania) should be repealed. Cost of registering transfers of
about 10% in Ghana and Malawi, and up to 20% and 30% in Nigeria,
Madagascar and Gambia, will drive land owners who had their rights
recognized back into informality.21 They can be lowered by reducing
stamp duties,22 streamlining institutional structures, and regulation
to eliminate surveyors’ or notaries’ monopolies.
Speed, outreach, and equity impact of systematic ﬁrst-time reg-
istration can often be enhanced by starting with communal land
boundaries ﬁrst and focusing on cheap image-based approaches,
to be supplemented by more precise surveys on owners’ demand
(and at their cost) will allow achieving scale quickly.23 Service
delivery by land administration institutions can also be improved,
e.g. by replacing analog paper-based methods with modern technol-
ogy, using common base maps, sharing data among Government
departments, publicizing service delivery standards, and institution-
alizing customer feedback can increase quality and accessibility of
land information.2419 In Ghana, more than 45% of cases in the court system related to land and in 2011
only 0.6% of the land cases were settled. Similarly, in Nigeria, out of a sample of
conﬂicts that had been resolved in the ﬁrst quarter of 2011, 61% were older than
5 years and 32% older than 10 years.
20 Sporadic ﬁrst time registration requires strong safeguards, e.g. a requirement of
neighbors’ consent, so that existing rights are not undermined.
21 High cost of formalizing transactions has often led to ‘deregularisation’ where
non-registration of subsequent transfers eroded the sustainability of beneﬁts (Galiani,
2011). Historically, lack of attention to costs made broad coverage with a sustainable
system of land registration impossible in the Philippines (Maurer and Iyer, 2008) and
resulted in the obsolescence of such systems (Barnes and Grifﬁth-Charles, 2007).
22 As stamp duties are associated with large welfare losses (Dachis et al., 2012), it
would be prudent to replace them with land taxes.
23 Even in South Africa, a country that has more than 500 qualiﬁed surveyors, high-
precision surveys of the estimated 20 million informal parcels will be very time
consuming, implying that a more expeditious approach will be needed.
24 Often this can be done quickly, as in Georgia which, since 2002, has completely
turned around the land registry from one of the most corrupt and least accountable
Government departments into a self-ﬁnancing institution with competitive salaries
(average 7 times pre-reform levels) and strong incentives to provide high quality
services.Going beyond a diagnostic review
While highlighting gaps in land governance, the above does not
allow identifying impacts on economic performance. To do so and
also highlight that change is possible even in the short term, we
review cases where improvements in land governance economic
outcomes. We then explore if outside investment can compensate
for weaknesses in land governance and brieﬂy discuss a monitor-
ing framework that can help track improvements and assess
broader impacts of improved land governance.
Effective strategies to improve land governance
One example that illustrates the potential of intervention to
systematically clarify who holds land rights is Mexico’s ejido
reform in the decade following the 1992 Constiutional Amend-
ment. Ejidos are communal settlements covering about half of
Mexico’s agricultural land, 70 per cent of its forests, and two-thirds
of the land needed for urban expansion. Reforms were motivated
by three factors, namely (i) the paradox that, due to rental restric-
tions, old ejidatarioswere unable to use their land effectively while
the young could not access it; (ii) powerful members being were
able to appropriate large common property resources and forests
as a source of patronage, hurting poor and indigenous people;
and (iii) a process of urban expansion based on informality, land
invasions and corruption rather than planning. Reforms comprised
legal changes, institutional reform and a systematic, well regu-
lated, program of land regularization that aimed to empower com-
munities to choose a suitable property rights regime (communal,
individual or mixed), increase transparency, tenure security and
investment, facilitate land transfers, and deal with a backlog of
long-standing conﬂicts. Ejidos’ legal personality was recognized
and creation of three bodies (the assembly, a vigilance committee
and a secretariat) mandated to ensure separation of powers and
internal checks and balances.25 Public institutions to support the
process include (i) 42 tribunals to administratively resolve the back-
log of land conﬂicts; (ii) a registry to document individual and collec-
tive rights and ejido bylaws; and (iii) the ofﬁce of the ombudsman to
provide para-legal assistance and oversight to prevent elite capture
and help the poor assert their rights. The accomplishments are
impressive: Over 18,000 ejidos formalized by-laws, some 100 mn. ha
(larger than Spain and France) were mapped, 2.9 mn. households
received certiﬁcates to individual, common or housing land, 1 mn.
households had precarious land rights recognized, migration and
productivity increased, and the process had far-reaching political
effect (de Janvry et al., forthcoming).
The difﬁculties of registering land encountered in many of our
sample countries contrast with good experience with low-cost
certiﬁcation from African countries. For example in Ethiopia, after
issuing land use certiﬁcates to about 630,000 households in Tigray
in 1998–99, other Ethiopian regions embarked on a large-scale cer-
tiﬁcation effort, issuing land-use certiﬁcates to more than 6 million
households (18 million plots) in 2003–05. In each village, this
involves awareness creation, elections of land-use committees,
and training. Assisted by elders, committees then systematically
resolve existing conﬂicts, referring cases that cannot be settled to
the courts. Undisputed plots are then demarcated in the presence
of neighbors with subsequent issuing of land-use certiﬁcates. For
married couples, certiﬁcates include names and pictures of both
spouses. Implementation was not biased against the poor and
certiﬁcates were much appreciated by recipients (Deininger et al.,
2008b).While theprocess canbe improved in areas such as coverage25 The assembly audits other ejido organs and can, with a majority of at least 75 per
cent of all members, approve contracts with outsiders or decide to individualize land
holdings.
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participation, the cost (some US$ 1 per plot) and achievements are
impressive. Tenure security, investment and rental increased
(Deininger et al., 2011a) with the Government now aiming to add
a map and deal with updating more systematically.26
Rwanda followed a similar approach that systematically
incorporates a map based on aerial photography. A clear policy
framework and extensive piloting were essential to create the pre-
conditions for a massive roll-out, encompassing some ﬁve years to
develop the policy framework and two years to reﬁne the process
in four pilots (15,000 plots in total). But, on this basis, nearly 10
million parcels were demarcated in about two years. The pilot
had very positive outcomes on gender equality (Ali et al., 2011)
which were superseded by the national-roll out which also had a
clear impact on improving land market activity.
Digitization alone will not improve data quality and thus reduce
transaction costs only, though doing so can somewhat increase
credit access in urban areas (Deininger and Goyal, 2012). But IT
can help reduce informal and possibly also formal fees as in
Karnataka where a public private partnership to computerize land
registration saved users some $16 million annually in bribes (Lobo
and Balakrishnan, 2002), largely by making land valuation more
transparent. It also increased demand for registration, allowing
stamp duty cuts from 14 to 8 per cent while quadrupling tax
revenue from $120 to $480 million (World Bank, 2007).28Can large scale investment help overcome land governance
constraints?
Weak land governance increases the risks of large scale land-
related investment for local land users who may lose vital
resources and livelihoods in the process, and for investors who will
face higher transaction costs and reputational risks. Results from
applying a large scale land acquisition module in some countries
(see Table 9),27 together with the ﬁnding that, across countries with
very different legal regimes, large investments ran into similar prob-
lems (German et al., 2013), suggest that attracting qualiﬁed and
responsible investors will be difﬁcult unless implementation
improves on the ground. For land-abundant countries that want to
attract investment, this underlines the importance of improving land
governance and transparency, to attract responsible investors but
also highlights the scope to use investment demand as a means to
justify reform.
While large scale land-based investment is often dispersed and
ad hoc, a few simple criteria such as agro-ecological potential,
proximity to infrastructure, and population density will allow
identiﬁcation of areas where such investment would have rela-
tively high returns, both for the public and the private sector
(Jordan, 2014). For the public sector, investments in infrastructure
and technology can help leverage private funds if focus areas for
such investment are chosen in ways that have a high likelihood
of generating spillovers. Systematic documentation of existing
rights on an area-wide basis in a way that links with land use plan-
ning will not only be more cost-effective, transparent, and in line
with criteria for proper land use than a sporadic approach but also26 Some policies, in particular the threat of uncompensated expropriation for urban
expansion, leave considerable tenure insecurity. To realize the full potential of ﬁrst-
time registration, action will be needed to (i) put in place arrangements for low-cost
updating and publicity of registry information; (ii) consistent inclusion of common
property resources (CPRs), possibly in combination with land-use planning and
assignment of group rights, to arrest threats of encroachment and resource
degradation; (iii) exploring options for systematic addition of a graphical record;
and (iv) policy measures to compensate in case of expropriation, protect contracts
and provide security against arbitrary redistribution, and allow land-use rights to be
transferred for longer time periods (World Bank, 2011).
27 The module was not applied in Gambia, Malawi, and Mauritania.allow better functioning of markets and reduces risks of encroach-
ing on existing rights or interacting with individuals or groups who
are not true right holders.
Local communities in many areas of interest to investors may
lack the ability to assess the technical and economic viability of
investments, identify key challenges associated with them,
effectively negotiate complicated contracts, or enforce compliance
with such contracts even if judicial infrastructure were accessible.
Without ways to rigorously screen proposals for technical viability,
ill-conceived investments may cause large and possibly irrevers-
ible damage. Vetting of contracts with genuine private sector input
has produced high returns and helped improve knowledge in other
settings.28
Making information on economic and social impact assess-
ments generated by investors in their due diligence process pub-
licly available would reduce their reputational risk and allow
them to distinguish themselves to potential funders (important
given the high capital cost of agriculture) and to potential partners
higher up in the supply chain. Similarly, publishing key elements of
contracts could help protect investors against governments reneg-
ing or arbitrarily changing key contractual provisions (e.g. invest-
ment volumes, number of jobs created, and resource transfers to
local people). It can also provide a basis for third party veriﬁcation
to not only ensure investors are on track in implementing their
business plans but also allow their customers manage risks in their
supply chain. Making such information available will also provide a
basis for much faster settlement of any disputes that may arise in
this context as it increases the amount of written evidence that can
be drawn upon. Two important side-effects for the public sector
are that this will make it much easier to establish criteria for ‘fail-
ure’ of a project so as to allow deployment of the assets from such
ventures in alternative opportunities. Moreover, it will allow mon-
itoring of aggregate trends, something that is likely to be more
effective in confronting fears about undesirable consequences of
such investment than wholesale restrictions that would deprive
the economy of funds and innovation. The US example illustrates
not only that such reporting is possible at low cost but also that
it can provide a basis for taking action if real concerns arise in
speciﬁc sectors or areas.29Towards land governance monitoring
Land governance is not static so that continued monitored will
be needed. While there may be some setup cost, the fact that reg-
istries generate large amounts of data in the course of their regular
operation provides an opportunity to regularly provide informa-
tion on key land governance indicators at low cost. Based on our
discussion above, 6 areas seem to be particularly relevant:
The share of communal land with use rights mapped is a key
concern in Africa where, as discussed, the law recognizes commu-
nal rights but does not delineate them, thereby limiting the ability
for enforcement. It is also eminently actionable as it is possible to
make rapid progress even with limited resources. DisaggregationIn Mexico communities’ ability to draw on assistance and independent vetting of
all contracts by the Procuraduria Agraria was invaluable. In Peru’, a public auction
process together with independent professional vetting of proposals helped attract
investors (as it reduced red tape), and improved outcomes and local beneﬁts.
29 While proper comparisons between the proﬁtability of large (and often domestic)
investors and local smallholders are still rare, this is an important area for future
research. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases investors’
productivity may not be signiﬁcantly above that by local smallholders and invest-
ments are viewed more as a portfolio diversiﬁcation strategy (Jayne, personal
communication). The 1978 Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA),
which requires reporting of foreign investment in agricultural land seems to have
helped to rationalize the debate through regular reports (http://www.fsa.usda.gov/
FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=ecpa&topic=afa).
Table 9
LGAF scoring for large scale land acquisition, 7 African and 3 non-African countries. Source: Own elaboration from country level LGAF reports.
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bring in gender aspects.
The share of land registered in women’s name (individually or
jointly) is a key indicator of female empowerment. It can be com-
puted not only for the formal system but also for semi-formal ones
that are maintained by the Government.
The number and prices of registered land transactions provide
information on declared land values and policy distortions that
may lead them to differ from market prices and provide insight
on the extent to which the registry remains current over time, a
very important issue in practice as barriers to registration may
undermine the sustainability of large investments made in land
administration systems.
The amount of land tax collected by local entities illustrates local
governments’ efforts at own revenue generation rather than rely-
ing on central transfers or discretionary exemptions and helps to
document the scope for integrating land ownership and tax records
with land use planning.
Obtaining information on the area expropriated and compensa-
tion paid requires a list of all agencies that can expropriate land
but allows quantifying and increase transparency in an area that
is often a key source of tenure insecurity or patronage.
While the number of land-related conﬂicts in the courts may be
difﬁcult to collect where courts are not computerized, even sam-
ples can point towards policy issues that need to be resolved for
large investments in land institutions to make sense and the scope
for systematic conﬂict resolution to promote investment.
Efforts to systematically collect this information underway in
some of the countries where LGAF has been completed support
the notion that such data can be collected easily and suggests other
advantages, namely (i) high spatial granularity and an ability to
disaggregate30; (ii) the ability to track progress in real time; and
(iii) a potential to overlay with socio-economic census or household
survey information. This can allow use of such data to identify distri-
butional issues and possibly conduct more sophisticated evaluations
to provide insights on the impact of land governance constraints in
due course.
Conclusion and policy implications
Although the importance of land governance for Africa’s agri-
cultural and broader development has long been acknowledged,30 While disaggregation should be possible to the plot level, it will in practice be
limited by conﬁdentiality issues and reporting units.the extent to which it was reﬂected in country strategies,
addressed effectively by speciﬁc programs, or monitored over time
was limited. Increasing land scarcity in the context of rapid
population growth, together with the fact that, even in land abun-
dant countries, a rapid pace of land transfers to outsiders that is
often not accompanied by increased productivity may rapidly
dis-equalize land access without providing corresponding gains,
resulted in renewed interest in the topic. Policy-makers at various
levels recognized the need to change this and agreed on broad
principles for doing so (FAO, 2012; African Union, 2009). But, to
be effective, these principles need to be translated into practice
at country level. By illustrating results from 10 African countries,
this paper demonstrates that the LGAF provides a participatory
way to do so global public goods, from avoidance of conﬂict and
social instability to facilitating more effective responses to climate
change. Translating the agreed policy priorities into action requires
more detailed technical analysis and testing of promising
approaches at country level which, in turn, will provide an oppor-
tunity for more detailed impact evaluations. Together with the
framework for monitoring suggested here, this should improve
our understanding of the impact of gaps in land governance on
agricultural productivity and well-being by poor households as
well as effective ways of closing such gaps.References
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